The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a non-empty epsilon-core. Our...

This is Part II of a study of the axiomatic and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation. Part I is a user's guide. Part II discusses alternatives to the axiomatic method and answers criticisms often addressed at the axiomatic method.

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8]...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.

The paper considers parametric and nonparametric estimation of the distribution function F. Issues of particular interest are the identification properties of this model and, in the nonparametric case, the speed of convergence of the estimator F. The latter depends upon the properties of the...

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.