Showing 1 - 10 of 129
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168489
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a non-empty epsilon-core. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168507
Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634090
The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660512
We propose a model of a random normal game for given (finite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774058
We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone signalling games. The learning process is a development of that introduced by Young for static games extended to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774065
A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quas-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequency of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795292
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824004
This paper explains the observed stagnation of 'Happiness' measures in the post-war period through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812253
The authors provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. They suggest that forward induction may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005816407