We present a new model of an economy with clubs, where players may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs may engage in a variety of club activities. The activities of each club may be unique to that club and may include provision of private goods, public goods, or simply covariance. Three...

We introduce the framework of parametrized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games without (and with) sidepayments. The framework and theorems are sufficiently general to encompass results in the literature on nonemptiness of...

We test competing explanations for contributions in social dilemma games. Hypotheses are classified in two ways : bgy key concept and by strategy sensitivity.

For the assignment game, we anlayze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first, then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential proces, while the second phase determines...

A logico-linguistic model is put forward to represent players' knowledge and beliefs.

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good).

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the set of alternatives is represented by the Euclidean plane. The individual utilities for the compromise point are equal to the negatives of the distances of this point to the...

This study welcomes the assumption that players respect the recommendations made by any given Equilibrium Selction Theory when the game played "suggests" no other alternative and evident way to play.

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy...