We consider repeated interaction among several producers of a homogeneous, divisible good, traded at a common market. Demand is uncertain, and its law is unknown.

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation...

We look at private-provision-of-public goods games. These games share an assumption that family members non-cooperatively use their resources either to acquire a private good or a family-specific good. What exactly constitutes the "private good" and the "public good" will be seen to vary from...

Motivated by repeated play of non-cooperative games, we study equation solving undertaken in parallel by several non-communicating agents, each dealing with his own block of variables. The process is akin to Newton's method in using derivative information. It does, however, proceed without...

A special class of cooperative transferable-utility games where each agent faces an optimization problem constrained by resources that can be pooled among coalition members, so-called production games, are here extended and applied in novel ways. First, I relax linearity requirements; second, I...

Motivated by non-cooperative games we study repeated interaction among non-communicating agents, each dealing with his black of variables, each moving merely on the bases of his marginal payoff and its most recent change. Adjustment of play thus unfolds in parallel. Constrants are accommodated....

Accomodated here is a measure space of economic agents, each regarded as a profit maximizing producer, each endowed with his technology and resource bundle. Pooling of private endowments generates a cooperative game with side payments.

We provide a new and simple convergence analysis for fictitious play of two-person, two-strategy games. Some generalizations are also given.

Two producers delegate sales of differentiated products to common retailers, each with a monopoly position. Each producer can offer either a linear or a two-part tariff. In the single period game each producer's dominant strategy is to use a two-part tariff. If the two producers' products are...

The main objects here are two-stage games in which players first compete and subsequently collaborate. We consider instances where second-stage collaboration is anticipated and sustained in terms of core solutions.