The core of an economy consists of those states of the economy which no group of agents (coalition) can "improve upon". A coalition can improve upon a state of the economy if, by using the means available to that group, each member can be made better off. This paper presents the notion of the...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic...

We show in a differential game of a differentiated product doupoly model of price competition with costly production adjustment that when firms are symmetric the leadership attempt by each firm turns into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a (MArkov perfect) steady state outcome more competitive...

Some of the most interesting results in the modern theory of fiscal federalism indicate that, contrary to expectations, even if there are interstate externalities, socially optimal policy choices are a non cooperative equilibrium of a game played by sovereign states. These results are shown to...

В статье анализируются проблемы гражданско-правового регулирования отношений возникающих при организации и проведении игр и пари. Раскрывается содержание...

Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where...