We analyse optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage...

We explore the hold-up problem when trading parties can make specific investments simultaneously or sequentially. As previously emphasized in the literature, sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime. This is not always the...

The study addresses the issue of sustainability of collusion in one-sided auctions. Earlier experimental studies indicate that, in double oral auctions, collusion is hard to sustain even if conspiracy is allowed and quotation improvement rules are absent. We investigate the role of similar...

A continuous time dynamic price and quantity game is analysed between the seller and the consumer of an addictive substance. Consumption dynamics are modelled using a Becker Murphy rational addiction model. Conditional on the buyer's consumption strategy, a monopoly seller manipulates the price...

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequences of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to...

The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

We explore hold-up when trading parties can make specific investments simultaneously or sequentially. With simultaneous investment both investors are held-up. With sequential investment contracting becomes possible after the project has commenced, so the second investor avoids being held-up. If...

This paper constructs a simple repeated game model to analyze how industry outcomes alter if a regulated input monopolist is allowed to integrate into the downstream retail market. Integration helps overcome double marginalization-a feature well known in the existing literature. Unlike existing...

We study how people's predisposition towards altruism, as measured by tools developed by psychologists, affects their behaviour in a voluntary contributions public good environment. Earlier experiments provide evidence against the strong free rider hypothesis; however, contributions to the...