Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...

This paper establishes a B-core existence result for normal form TU games.

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...

We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior - strategy - which is adopted by a...

This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1997), we define two types of natural mechanisms quantity and price-quantity types, in convex production economies, and characterize the class of Pareto subsolutions doubly implementable in Nash and strong Nash equilibria...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior - strategy - which is adopted by a...

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...