We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R & D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as fuctions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent,...

If a solution (on a closed family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independance of irrelevant strategies (IIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

This contribution investigates the effectiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and...

A component of Nash equilibria is potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. Anecessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing a bilateral oligopoly situation, which constitutes a particular example of a...

We introduce a procedure that uses basic typological charasteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the...