We fuse a social dilemma game and a game pitting the group against nature, where the group's probability of avoiding disaster depends on the resources it raises from members. The result is the Nederlander-Prisoner's Dilemma Game where the cost of failure is equally shared. We introduce the...

We reformulate the Humean farmer game on the basis of random assignment of advantage and the cost e of helping in another’s harvest. The result is a game that is a coordination game if e < ½ or a dominant strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma Game if e > ½ which allows a joint treatment of the two interpretations of the Humean farmer game. We employ two...</½>

J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce...

We revisit the question of why fixed rent contracts are less prevalent than crop share contracts despite Marshallian inefficiency. We consider the case where the type of the principal is endogenous to contract provisions and reneging by the principal may pay due to weak third party enforcement...