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On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Caparrós Gass, Alejandro; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim; … - 2004

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029312

Strategic Alliances in Coalitional Bargaining

Lee, Joosung - 2018

, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922042

Multilateral bargaining in networks : on the prevalence of inefficiencies

Lee, Joosung - 2015

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698

Game theory and international environmental co-operation: A survey with an application to the Kyoto-Protocol

Finus, Michael - 2000

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608649

Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts

Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999

Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points

Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013

Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971

Do Workers Negotiate Collectively or Separately? An Application of a Coalitional Bargaining Game with Externalities

Kiyotaki, Fumi - 2016

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996131

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

Supplement to 'Equivalent Conditions for the Existence of an Efficient Equilibrium in Coalitional Bargaining with Externalities and Renegotiations'

Kawamori, Tomohiko - 2017

This supplement provides proofs of all propositions in [Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa, "Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations Research Letters 45(5), 427-430, 2017]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953535

Proportional payoffs in majority games

Montero, María (contributor) - 2008

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312