, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …

informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission … exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the … proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the …

international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a … climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge … despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …