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We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029312
, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922042
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608649
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of utilities of coalition members. The transfers scheme is tested …, einer Koalition beizutreten oder nicht. Bezüglich der Koalitionäre wird kollektive Wohlfahrtsmaximierung angenommen …, Outsider handeln individuell rational. Für die Aufteilung des durch die Koalition generierten Effizienzgewinns wird ein …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285892
modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399
This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191