Policy advocates frequently request for unilateral action to push forward climate protection in international negotiations. It is yet conventional wisdom in environmental economics that unilateral action does not pay for the first mover due to free-riding behavior of the other countries. How...

This paper studies the influence of productivity, pollution sensitivity, and adaptive capacity on optimal mitigation and adaptation in a two country global pollution model. We investigate the effects of changes of these parameters on the allocation of emissions, adaptation expenditures, and...

We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in...

We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous regions or countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature....

We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public "bad" game, where we manipulate both the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group. The game...

We examine the formation of multilateral, hub-and-spoke and bilateral international R&D strategic alliances (overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global public good (i.e., reduction of CO2 emissions) and...