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The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group
Grout, Paul A.; Mitraille, Sébastien; Sonderegger, Silvia - In: Journal of economic theory 160 (2015), pp. 517-535
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549546
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Cheap-talk coordination of entry by privately informed firms
Park, In-Uck - In: The Rand journal of economics 33 (2002) 3, pp. 377-393
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001714631
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Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
Park, In-Uck - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 2, pp. 431-448
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001229213
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Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
Park, In-Uck - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000896703
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Overcoming the coordination problem : dynamic formation of networks
Ochs, Jack; Park, In-Uck - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 2, pp. 689-720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003972858
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Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
Morelli, Massimo; Park, In-Uck - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009238624
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Coordinating public good provision by mediated communication
Halonen, Maija; Park, In-Uck - In: American economic journal 13 (2021) 2, pp. 311-342
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546704
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Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
Morelli, Massimo; Park, In-Uck - 2014 - This version: October 30, 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011814047
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Communication, feedbacks and repeated moral hazard with short‐lived buyers
Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181935
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Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
Morelli, Massimo; Park, In-Uck - In: Games and economic behavior 96 (2016), pp. 90-96
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742206