. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with no commitment, under the assumption that the union chooses wages each … entire (infinite) sequence of wages. We conclude that the speed of adjustment of employment, that is higher in the … employment and wages only in the no-commitment case, i.e., the higher the relevance of adjustment costs the higher the wage and …

. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with no commitment, under the assumption that the union chooses wages each … entire (infinite) sequence of wages. We conclude that the speed of adjustment of employment, that is higher in the … employment and wages only in the no-commitment case, i.e., the higher the relevance of adjustment costs the higher the wage and …

. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with no commitment, under the assumption that the union chooses wages each … entire (infinite) sequence of wages. We conclude that the speed of adjustment of employment, that is higher in the no … and wages only in the no-commitment case, i.e., the higher the relevance of adjustment costs the higher the wage and …

game theory and applications. The editors focus on a select set of issues that stand high on the agenda of academic … understanding of the dilemmas posed for theory and policy. Readers are offered new empirical evidence on such thorny social problems … as, for example, unemployment, the intergenerational transmission of human capital and the response of wages to price and …