This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum...

This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between individuals generate social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard when agents interact in a borrowing relationship. We define trust between two agents as the maximum...

This paper shows that the equilibrium selection results for coordination games of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) depend only on the criterion of risk dominance in local interaction environment even if mutations are state dependent. This qualifies the result of Bergin and Lipman...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select...