This paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogenous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information; complementarity heightens the sensitivity of...

This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint distribution of the private information variables affect a signal's effectiveness in revealing information about these variables. To illustrate the general problem investigated...

We find an effect of irrelevant information on adverse selection in a laboratory signaling game. This effect occurs via two channels: the principal is more (less) likely to adversely reject signals from “good” (“bad”) types. The findings suggest that “perception (or perhaps,...

This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the 'value of information' for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a...

This paper studies the full implementation in sequential information design (Doval and Ely (2020)) in which the designer can construct the extensive form as well as the information struc- ture. In this framework, I characterize the optimal outcome under full implementation when players and the...

In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether...

In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether...

Many transactions in the marketplace rely on hard (or verifiable) information about the underlying value of the intended exchange, typically through certification--- housing, diamonds, bonds being cases in point. What is the class of Pareto efficient certifications for such scenarios? This paper...

A principal hires an agent to acquire costly information that will influence the decision of a third party. While the realized piece of information is observable and contractible, the experimental process is not. Assuming a general family of information cost functions (inclusive of Shannon's...

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...