Showing 1 - 10 of 12,755
that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440
We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. economic history, geography, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in federations. When the outcome of federal policies – such as transfer schemes, market regulation or migration laws – depends on these fundamentals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200220
To explore the propagation of undesirable policies in a form of populist extremism, we construct a social learning model featuring agency problems. Politicians in different countries sequentially implement a policy. Voters learn the incumbent politician's type and the desirable policy by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195578
We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897350
The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude that EU is something betweenʺ federation and intergovernmental organization. If we measure something betweenʺ by interval [0, 1],...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880077
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private … information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the … coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies. -- Federalism ; Asymmetric Information ; Strategy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860044
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459198
the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in … with a simple game, this theory cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance for another treatment with a more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game … levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494