We revisit the well known differential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage. This allows to attain strong time consistency...

We propose a simple method for characterising analytically the feedback solution of oligopoly games with capital accumulation à la Solow-Swan. As a result, it becomes possible to contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. Our method...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

We identify a class of noncooperative games in continuous strategies which are best-response potential games. We identify the conditions for the existence of a best-response potential function and characterise its construction, describing then the key properties of the equilibrium. The...

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar...