This paper studies the role of public information in multiple-agent coordination problems underlying a variety of economic scenarios such as banking and debt crises. The impact of information on coordination in such settings rests on the interplay between two types of uncertainty that agents...

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the...

We experimentally test whether the possibility of building a reputation impacts behavior in the manner suggested by theory. Our unified reputation framework theoretically allows for either the good or the bad reputation prediction to emerge. Our design additionally varies whether reputation...

In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic...

We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type...

Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics games are generalizable to real decisions in non-laboratory settings. Furthermore, important questions persist about whether social capital can help solve seemingly missing credit markets. I conduct two experiments, a Trust game...

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a...