This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

The order of actions in contests may generate different psychological effects which, in turn, may influence contestants' probabilities to win. The Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence in which the first 'n' moves is the exact mirror image of the next 'n' moves should theoretically terminate any advantage...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

We analyze the behavior of producers who compete through price competition in a social environment from a sociological point of view. The standard model of Bertrand price competition is enriched with producers who follow a "Win Cooperate, Lose Defect" (WCLD) strategy. This strategy is a...

This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous....

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient...

We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. Using one-shot public goods experiments in four comparable subject pools from the US and the UK (two similar Western societies) and Morocco and...

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players-constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded...

We give variants on Berge's Maximum Theorem in which the lower and the upper semicontinuities of the preference relation are assumed for two different topologies on the action set, i.e., the set of actions availabe a priori to the decision-maker (e.g. a household with its consumption set). Two...