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Effects of hostility tradition in antitrust : leniency programs and cooperation agreements
Pavlova, Natalia; Šastitko, Andrej E. - 2014
The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465886
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Focality Advantage in Platform Competition
Halaburda, Hanna - 2019
We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial … focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in … competition between platforms that differ in their basic quality. The initial degree of focality affects the ability of the high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896384
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Predatory exclusive dealing
Klein, Joachim; Zenger, Hans - 2009
While the previous literature on exclusive dealing has been concerned with the question of how exclusive dealing can raise static profits, this paper analyzes the question of how exclusive dealing can be used to predate in a dynamic context. It is shown that exclusive dealing may arise even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951748
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Fighting cartels : some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003
Will, Birgit E.; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 2008
firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero. -- competition law ; cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875292
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Competition as a socially desirable dilemma theory vs. experimental evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2009
Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain loyal. If firms interact only once, if products are homogenous, if firms compete in price, and if marginal cost is constant, theory even predicts that strategic interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116
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On cheating and whistleblowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004
behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290
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Measuring the effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions : a conceptual framework
Katsulakos, Giannēs S.; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - 2016
Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b … derive measures of both the total and the marginal effects on welfare resulting from competition authority interventions and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431514
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Maximal cartel pricing and leniency programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377398
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The effects of leniency on maximal cartel pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378956
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Antitrust enforcement and marginal deterrence
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720709