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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be separated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper … we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a … post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539673
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2020
ineffective standard anti-corruption practices, such as whistle-blowing protection policies. We highlight that closing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220065
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Political Contestability and Public Contracting
Moszoro, Marian W. - 2018
, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940346
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Signaling an outside option
Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009
We consider the case of an upstream seller who works to improve an asset that has been specialized to a downstream buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take it or leave it offer to the seller about how the future surplus should be split. We assume that the seller from the outset has private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909276
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020 - Revised version
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318860
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Sticks and Carrots in Procurement
Bigoni, Maria - 2014
buyers' offers become more generous. Buyers tend to prefer penalties, which may explain why they are dominant in procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070449
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Vertical undbundling, the coordination of investment, and network pricing
Brunekreeft, Gert; Friedrichsen, Nele - 2010
This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity supply industry, although the analysis may apply also to other network industries. In an electric- ity system, the investment decisions of network and power plants need to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957
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Corporate Design for Regulability : A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model
Engel, Christoph - 2005
Corporate actors differ from individuals in one important respect: technically, it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to impact on its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technology is inducing corporate actors to hire an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062548
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White collar crime : unearthing collusion in the procurement of infrastructure projects
Signor, Regis; Love, Peter; Ika, Lavagnon - In: IEEE transactions on engineering management : EM 69 (2022) 5, pp. 1932-1943
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013431063