that although the game is not convex its core is always non-empty. Furthermore we provide a painting algorithm for large …

show that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an efficiently verifiable …-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games, for … example, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of …

strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with … between core and competitive equilibria is established …

pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of … this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann … the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a …

stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …