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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze a market for microfinance in a region of a developing nation in which all projects are either of high or low quality. There is adverse selection because only borrowers know whether their project is of high or low quality but the microfinance...
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We analyze a market for microfinance in a region of a developing nation in which all projects are either of high or low quality. There is adverse selection because only borrowers know whether their project is of high or low quality but the microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not. The MFIs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203528
We use a Stackelberg differential game to model trade in renewable resources between a monopsonistic buyer and a monopolistic seller. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these tariffs in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707917
In this note we analyze a game model of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977111
The n total consumers in the market for a particular good are made up of b brown and g green consumers so that b g=n. The b brown (g green) consumers are not (are) environmentally conscious and hence they prefer to buy a new (remanufactured) good denoted by N and R respectively. By strategically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981170
In this note we analyze a game of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no pure-strategy Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964740