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This paper addresses the question of whether our evolutionary history suggests that humans are likely to be individually selected selfish maximizers or group selected altruists. It surveys models from the literature of evolutionary biology in which groups are formed and dissolved and where the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023672
In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. Recently we considered in Glycopantis a bargaining model which breaks away from this traditional treatment by employing lexicographic preferences of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861824
depends on both the individual and the context. For example, non-zero-sum cooperation (e.g. in social dilemmas like the … favor social dilemma cooperation regardless of gender, but only favor DG giving among women. Here I present meta …-analytic evidence in support of this prediction. In 31 studies examining social dilemma cooperation (N=13,447), I find that promoting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970187
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334971
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to … construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710
A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952674
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956538
The ultimatum game is a sequential-move bargaining game in which a “giver” offers a “taker” a share of a monetary pie. The predicted subgame perfect equilibrium is for rational givers to offer the smallest possible share, and for rational takers to accept. Experimental trials conducted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905908
We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one matching market between firms and workers. When no agents are strategic, the resulting outcome is the firm-optimal stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898433