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We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690900
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213898
We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient, which represent second-stage choice problems. The recipient is only aware of second-stage choice of an allocation. Not choosing the normatively best allocation in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189519
of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance … experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same … differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339883
of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance … experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same … differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327335
We study a two-stage choice problem. In the first stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a set of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. In the second stage, DM chooses an allocation from the set. The recipient is only aware of the second stage choice. Choosing selfishly in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208757
We introduce the uncertainty of psychological motivation into a reciprocity model and explore its implications on behavior. We extend the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium in extensive-form games (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) to a broader class of incomplete information games. We use this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012795762
This paper uses data from a controlled laboratory environment to study the impact of transparency (i.e., complete information versus incomplete information) and repeated interactions on the level of trust and trustworthiness in an investment game setting. The key findings of the study are that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146969
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538925
How do firms motivate their employees to be productive? The conventional wisdom is that workers respond to monetary incentives - "Pay them more and they will work harder." However, a large and growing body of empirical evidence from laboratory and field experiments, surveys, and observational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011413663