Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,213
Cover Image
Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
Cover Image
A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good...
Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703
Cover Image
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
Kuzmics, Christoph; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2016
Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the utility from participating in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435962
Cover Image
Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
Cover Image
Level-k mechanism design
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
Cover Image
Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721
Cover Image
Efficiency Effects on Coalition Formation in Contests
Nevrekar, Saish - 2022
approach by assuming certain properties for the winning probability that imply efficiency gains from cooperation in contest … settings. Efficiency gains are said to be generated if any coalition experiences increasing marginal returns with aggregate … generate sufficient efficiency gains, then any equilibrium always consists of two or more coalitions where at least two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669
Cover Image
First-mover disadvantage
Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2006
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373494
Cover Image
'Take it or Leave it' Offers : Obstinacy and Endogenous Deadlines in Negotiations
Ozyurt, Selcuk - 2015
A bargainer uses "take it or leave it" offers to signal that he is not willing to make further concessions (commitment threat) and that he will leave the bargaining table unless his demand is accepted (exit threat). This paper investigates the impact of these threats on rational negotiators'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014127
Cover Image
A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083