We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this...

We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case in which banks compete to collect their loans from a firm in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real options approach to investigate banksf optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the bank with the larger loan amount, namely,...

We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001), our design keeps the riskiness ratio of the payoff-dominant and the risk-dominant strategies at a constant level as the optimisation premium is increased. We define the riskiness ratio as the...

We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case that banks compete to collect their loans from a firm falling in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real options approach to investigate bankfs optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the bank with the larger loan amount, namely...

Experimentation is at the core of innovation. This project studies collaborative experimentation in teams, focusing on the inherent two-dimensional free-riding problem induced by payoff and informational externalities. The discouraging force of observing others' unsuccessful experimentation and...

We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity...

It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses...

We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this...

This paper studies reinsurance contracting and competition in a continuous-time model with ambiguity. The market consists of one insurer and two reinsurers, who apply a generalized expected-value premium principle and a generalized variance premium principle to price reinsurance contracts,...

The authors extend the standard public goods game in a variety of ways, in particular by allowing for endogenous preference over institutions and by studying the relationship between individual types, their preferences, and later behavior within the various institutional environments. They...