Showing 1 - 10 of 2,908
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734516
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412685
How can a single player defend against the threat of a coordinated attack by a group? For example, how can a central bank defend a currency peg against speculators, a government against a revolution or a prison warden against a breakout? Bentham (1787) proposed an innovative prison concept based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014971
How can a single player defend against the threat of a coordinated attack by a group? For example, how can a central bank defend a currency peg against speculators, a government against a revolution or a prison warden against a breakout? Bentham (1787) proposed an innovative prison concept based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015698
Consider a society where ethnic conflict is imminent due to people's belief about the state of the world. An `informed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904240
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose between fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850614
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093240
We present a version of Baliga and Sjöström’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093382