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Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
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Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
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Communication and market sharing : an experiment on the exchange of soft and hard information
Freitag, Andreas; Roux, Catherine; Thöni, Christian - 2019
We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with multiple markets and repeated interaction, we vary the types of information that firms can exchange. We distinguish between hard information-verifiable information about past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134028
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Naked exclusion with private offers
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg Eric - 2014
We consider a seller s ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to its downstream buyers. Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) showed that this can be a pro fitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers. Segal and Whinston (2000) showed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483054
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Let's lock them in : collusion under consumer switching costs
Fourberg, Niklas - 2018
Consumer switching costs cause the market demand of consumers who already bought a supplier's product to be less elastic while they simultaneously increase competition for new consumers. I study the effect of this twofold pricing incentive on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892961
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Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability
Han, Martijn A. - 2011
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot game reduces firm profits. However, with infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation allows for an improvement in cartel stability compared to the infinitely repeated standard Cournot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132037
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Taxation and the sustainability of collusion : ad valorem versus specific taxes
Azacis, Helmuts; Collie, David R. - 2014
critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for … Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406210
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Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion : experimental evidence
Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias - 2023
This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442786
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How Much Collusion? A Meta-Analysis on Oligopoly Experiments
Engel, Christoph - 2007
this evidence available. More than 100 of the papers lend themselves to calculating an index of collusion. The data bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053957
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On the Sustainability of Collusion in Bertrand Supergames with Discrete Pricing and Nonlinear Demand
Zimmerman, Paul R. - 2010
sustainability of collusion is independent of key demand and supply parameters. Recent research has demonstrated that these …). This note considers the effects of demand curvature in the context of a model of collusion where, as in Gallice (2008 … effects of increased concavity (or convexity) in market demand on the sustainability of collusion runs in opposite directions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198641