In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Briber. We argue that when the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This gives rise to a delegation effect, which could undercut corruption as compared to what arises in two...

This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six...

Companies employ managers for either practical, legal or administrative reasons. However, no matter what the reason, the good performance of managers and the success of companies are vital elements for firms. At this point, managerial incentives play a key role. In this paper, we use the VFJS...

This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions aimed at increasing public goods provision in settings in which accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to exploit lying aversion by requiring subjects to send a non-verifiable ex post...