In this paper a simple model is used to analyse the strategic behaviour of countries that bargain over CO2 emission reductions. Five main world regions are considered and their incentives to sign an international agreement on climate change control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to...

In this paper, the reaction of firms to the introduction of environmental charges in a given industry is analyzed. Firms may decide either to relocate their plants abroad or to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. The latter can be either developed by investing in R&D or obtained by...

In this paper a n-player non-cooperative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is...

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign a global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same...

We demonstrate that there are links between international trade and environmental control, heretofore unappreciated, which might substantially alter the efficacy of various governmental policies to control pollution. One concern about national environmental policies is that, whereas the benefits...

In this paper we study some of the consequences of national environmental policy in a strategic international setting. Two broad questions are analyzed. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of environmental policy by a country in a Cournot game will make that country worse...

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a "libertarian" baseline condition, we find that policy...

I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...

In this paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource monopolist as a dynamic game between a monopolist and n importing countries governments, and we investigate whether a tariff on resource imports can be advantageous for the consumers of the importing countries when the...

Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which an environmental friendly substitute is available. When deciding to buy differentiated products, a compromise is sometimes made between preferred characteristics of the good and its environmental properties....