We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of …

observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second …

Many institutions use matching algorithms to allocate resources to individuals. Examples include the assignment of …

every fair matching is Pareto efficient. Based on the extended Pareto efficiency definition, the DA mechanism is the unique …

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a … matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students …

für eine Seite des Marktes existieren und bei größer werdenden Märkten in der Praxis sogar abnehmen. -- Matching … Stability of Marriage" (1962) led to a huge and still growing discussion in the literature on two-sided matching markets. The … twosided matching markets, e.g., within the marriage and college admissions problem. The incentives to manipulate are …