In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to more...

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point", is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer's sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that...

The paper examines how rules and institutions as well as the monetary-fiscal coordination setup impact welfare outcomes of a reform during uncertainty shocks. We define uncertainty shocks as sudden events that create ambiguity about future course of economic policies chosen by policy makers as...

Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games players contribute or not to the production of a public good which is produced if and only if there are "enough" contributors. There is a plethora of equilibria in BTPG games. We experimentally test general theoretical attributes of equilibria and...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select...

Theories about unique equilibrium selection are often rejected in experimental investigations. We drop the idea of selecting a single prominent equilibrium but suggest the coexistence of different beliefs about "appropriate" equilibrium or non-equilibrium play. Our main selection criterion is...