In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions on the payoff function f and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probability measures instead of the set of mixed strategies.

Hausken (2008a) formulates a contest-theoretic model of the attack and defense of a network of targets. This note identies a technical error that invalidates Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space that he examines and provides necessary...

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The...

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The...

Firms' quality commitment can efficiently improve the demand. This paper addresses the quality commitment under the duopoly. By establishing a Cournot model, the effects of quality commitment are discussed. Firstly, under one-sided quality commitment, the higher efficiency firm committing in...

In this paper we investigate when public enforcement of insider trading regulations reduces the amount of insider trading. We model a game between a potentially self-interested regulator enforcing insider trading laws and a trader who may be trading on inside information. We show that...

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of...

We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of “structurally similar” games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject was introduced who either silently observed or observed and got to...