Morton and Wecker (1977) stated that the value iteration algorithm solves a dynamic program's policy function faster than its value function when the limiting Markov chain is ergodic. I show that their proof is incomplete, and provide a new proof of this classic result. I use this result to...

In this paper we study an extension of the linear production game (LPG) introduced by Owen (1975). We discuss LPG with players who have flexible resources. Here, flexibility means that a player has a universal resource (e.g. working time) which he can split up (e.g. to execute different tasks)....

In this paper, we analyse a continuous time version of Fish Wars with the infinite time horizon and state dependent constraints on controls. We calculate the social optimum and a Nash equilibrium which always leads to the depletion of the resource even if the social optimum results in the...

This note analyzes in a fishery management problem the effects of relaxing one of the usual assumptions in the literature of dynamic games. Specifically, the assumption that players restrict to strategies that stabilize the system. Previous works in the literature have shown that feedback Nash...

In this paper, intraseasonal fishing is modeled as a differential game between fishermen in a total allowable catch-regulated fishery with and without individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Heterogeneous harvest values are included by incorporating time-specific harvest costs and a stock effect into...

We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her...

Embarking from the concept of uniform payoff security (Journal of Econonomic Theory, Vol. 134, 2007), we introduce two other uniform conditions and then study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games where the sum of the payoff functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous

The focus of this paper is on developing geometric sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of...

We re-analyse participant behaviour in standard economics experiments studying voluntary contributions to a public good. Previous approaches were based in part on a priori models of decision-making, such as maximising personal earnings, or reciprocating the behaviour of others. Many participants...

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...