We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information available to the experimental subjects in a simple,...

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain...

Scholars have long recognized the difficulties of communicating risk to the public. The rise of mobile gaming presents unprecedented opportunities for risk communicators to reach millions of potential users in engaging and potentially effective ways. Gamifying risk communication may help users...

In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Theoretical and experimental research in the spirit of level k models has characterized the behavior of agents with different levels of reasoning when p is persistently...

The problem of choosing an optimal toolkit day after day, when the distribution of values of different toolkits is uncertain and can only be observed by carrying different toolkits, is a multi-armed bandit problem with non-independent arms. Accordingly, except for very simple specifications,...

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

The rational expectations equilibrium has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We define a rational...

This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...