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Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945
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Cooperative strategic games
Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
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A cooperative value for Bayesian games
Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710
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The Bonacich Shapley centrality
Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K. - 2021
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584076
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An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism
Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2021
-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our … bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012695303
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The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games
Pham Do, Kim Hang; Norde, Henk - 2011
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199078
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680
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Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?
Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48
The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895
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Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2015
There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477095
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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den - 2009
Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796