Showing 1 - 10 of 4,453
We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094506
. -- Signaling game ; Consideration set ; Counter signaling ; Limited attention ; Marketing ; Advertising …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516790
A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction … to the equilibrium of a screening game in which an uninformed monopoly broker chooses the trading mechanism. We show that … the ex-ante expected probability of trade may be larger with a monopoly broker, as well as the ex-ante total expected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064734
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
later stages in favor of early leaders. Even in the worst-case scenario, where noise swamps ability differences in … determining relative performance, optimal bias is i) strictly positive; ii) locally insensitive to changes in the heterogeneity-to-noise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362244
This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929804