Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than "the rest of us"? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound "rational choice" answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Briber. We argue that when the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This gives rise to a delegation effect, which could undercut corruption as compared to what arises in two...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players...

This paper introduces Gm, which is a category for extensive-form games. It also provides some applications. The category's objects are games, which are understood to be sets of nodes which have been endowed with edges, information sets, actions, players, and utility functions. Its arrows are...