We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by learning from past behavior of others and then best respond to these beliefs looking k periods ahead. We...

We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn `across games' by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent's individual solution concept is represented by a...

We experimentally study behavior in a common property renewable resource extraction game with multiple equilibria. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract and consume a renewable resource in continuous time. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with...

This paper looks to see if subjects approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games featuring discounted payoffs with an option to opt out differently from how they approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that are randomly terminated. I show under relatively...

The dynamics generated by individual learning mechanisms in evolutionary games rely upon the relationship between imitation and experimentation. We consider the dynamics created by individuals who learn through a process of selective imitation, for a general class of sequential, symmetric,...

How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but...

This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...

We experimentally test the ability of subjects to identify repeated-game strategies from prisoner's dilemma choice data. In the experiments, subjects use a finite state grammar to build models to fit game histories. The histories are designed to distinguish between strategies with empirical and...

This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs...