International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and...

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is considerable confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated...

The water demand in the upstream and downstream of a transboundary river basin varies based on the water use by the irrigation projects, dam, hydroelectricity, ecosystem, livelihood practices and household activities of the people. The study considered the case of Teesta river basin and...

The axiomatic route to the foundation of contest success functions (CSF) has proved to be both useful and prolific. The standard approach in the literature is based on the decision-theoretic notion that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (Skaperdas, Economic...

We experimentally study behavior in a common property renewable resource extraction game with multiple equilibria. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract and consume a renewable resource in continuous time. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with...

Intrinsic motivation is shaped by attitudes towards others. In spite of their potential relevance for policy design, identifying individual preference types beyond population distributions remains a challenge. We use data from a common pool resource (CPR) game in the fi eld (935 individuals, 25%...

A differential game of global warming is offered. The game involves individual country social utility functions that balance gains from GHG emissions with damages due to global warming. Two state variables are involved, the concentration of anthropogenic GHG in the atmosphere, and the increase...

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under...

This chapter presents the theory of international environmental agreements (IEAs). It explains what treaties do (or should do); when and why they succeed or fail; and whether they can be designed better. It focuses on the main questions that the literature on this topic has tried to answer,...