We provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which firms face financial constraints and disappear when they are unable to fulfill them. We show that, in some cases, Cournot outputs are no longer supported in equilibrium, because if these outputs were set, a firm may have incentives to ruin the...

In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It...

This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregative games and the applications of this model to several fields of economics, other social sciences and engineering

Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also - and crucially so - on whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with...

This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregative games and the applications of this model to several fields of economics, other social sciences and engineering.

This paper presents a new decomposition approach for measuring deterrence motives in dynamic oligopoly games. Our approach yields a scale-free and interpretable measure of deterrence motives that informs researchers about the proportion for which deterrence motives account of all entry motives....

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

Price promotions and bundling have been two of the most widely used marketing tools in industry practice. Past literature has assumed that firms respond to price promotions by promoting a product in the same category. In this paper, we extend this literature as well as the bundling literature by...

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

Background: This paper develops a game theoretic model that analyses the dynamics of competition among the leading domestic aviation firms in the Nigerian aviation industry. It probes the abilities of the prisoner dilemma to describe the subjective behaviour of the firms, which provide a...