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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation
Forges, Francoise - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097801
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Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games - Second Version
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2017
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974183
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The economics of transboundary river management
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2014
We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the last decade due to increasing concerns over water scarcity and pollution. We outline the major approaches and pay specific attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412473
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Evolution of Cooperative Networks
Pandey, Siddhi - 2019
Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895261
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Plato as a game theorist towards an international trade policy
Halkos, George E.; Kyriazēs, Nikos K.; Economou, … - In: Journal of risk and financial management : JRFM 14 (2021) 3/115, pp. 1-15
In the beginning of the second book of his Politeia (Republic) Plato in passage 2.358e-359a-c raises the issue of the administration of justice as a means of motivating people to behave fairly regarding their relationships and when cooperating with each other because, at the end, this is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012485255
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Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game
Gamba, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - 2015
learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326679
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Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 157-185
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673067