When modeling the behavior of firms, marketers and micro-economists routinely confront complex problems of strategic interaction. In competitive environments, firms make strategic decisions that not only depend on the features of the market, but also on their beliefs regarding the reactions of...

We study a simultaneous, complete-information game played by p = 1 P agents. Each p has an ordinal decision variable Y p ∈ A p ={ 0 1 M p} , where M p can be unbounded, A p is p’s action space, and each element in A p is an action , that is, a potential value for Y p . The collective action...

We develop a minimum distance estimator for dynamic games of incomplete information. We take a two-step approach, following Hotz and Miller (1993), based on the pseudo-model that does not solve the dynamic equilibrium so as to circumvent the potential indeterminacy issues associated with...

Individual players in a simultaneous equation binary choice model act differently in different environments in ways that are frequently not captured by observables and a simple additive random error. This paper proposes a random coefficient specification to capture this type of heterogeneity in...

We devise a nonparametric test of strategic behavior in a multiproduct Cournot oligopoly. It is assumed that firms have cost functions that do not change over the period of observation but that market demand can change in each period. Market prices and firm-specific production quantities are...

We provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identification region of the parameters ø in a broad class of incomplete econometric models. Models in this class have set valued predictions that yield a convex set of conditional or unconditional moments for the observable model variables....