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Costly voluntary disclosure in a signaling game
Pecorino, Paul; VanBoening, Mark Virgil - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 15 (2019) 2, pp. 1-32
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197398
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Certifiable pre-play communication : full disclosure
Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric; Perez-Richet, … - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 82 (2014) 3, pp. 1093-1131
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506474
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Dynamic expert incentives in teams
Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Ling - In: Games and economic behavior 125 (2021), pp. 27-47
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616668
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Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2021
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251018
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Disclosure with unknown expertise
Li, Run - In: Economics letters 208 (2021), pp. 1-5
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013207091
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Information disclosure and liquidity crisis
Lee, Kyounghun; Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl - In: Journal of accounting and public policy 41 (2022) 2, pp. 1-9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013207643
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Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Screening Game
Pecorino, Paul - 2013
time. Fairness considerations appear to be important in explaining the deviation from theory. For a plaintiff with a strong … case, the return to revealing private information is approximately zero, while theory predicts that this return should be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079903
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Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2021 - Revised version
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336
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Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive
Friedman, Henry L.; Hughes, John S.; Michaeli, Beatrice - In: Journal of accounting & economics 69 (2020) 2/3, pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237570
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Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions
Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 171 (2020), pp. 234-246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012288021