This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic...

Beauchêne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. This note, defines...

In this paper, I seek to establish a framework in which solutions to imperfect recall decision problems can be suitably examined. I introduce a strategy concept which is an extension of the standard concept employed since von Neumann and Morgenstern, and show how it may provide optimal solutions...

We challenge the standard definition of economic rationality as consistency by making use of a novel distinction between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency...