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We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
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This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation …
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We consider a controlled school choice model where students are divided into several types such as socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. The priority for a school is dependent on the type distribution of the assignment. Our model is a generalization of several models in previous...
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the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …
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