The draft for a CCCTB Directive in the EU includes the suggestion for an apportionment formula which allocates taxable profits to group member corporations and to the respective Member States. The draft directive delegates the right to define one apportionment factor, the term ‘Employee’ to...

Executives use a variety of manipulative games to maximize the value of their gifts, including backdating, spring-loading, bullet-dodging and insider information. We find that executives exploit a legal loophole to backdate their gifts. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year...

The VAT is compared to a turnover tax (TT) given monopoly final goods and intermediate goods firms interacting strategically. Linear demands and constant costs are assumed. Via examples it is shown that for both "Cournot" and "Stackelberg" games, a revenue neutral VAT may not exist to a given...

According to plans put forward by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, a share of residual profit earned by eligible MNEs is to be taxed by market jurisdictions. For this purpose, revenue-based formulaic apportionment of residual profit is proposed. This note argues against the use of a...

This paper characterises the domestic tax systems which yield Pareto-efficient outcomes for a two-country world economy in which each country uses distortionary taxes. Such outcomes are compared with the Nash equilibria of the world economy when each country uses its domestic tax system to...

This paper characterises the domestic tax systems which yield Pareto-efficient outcomes for a two-country world economy in which each country uses distortionary taxes. Such outcomes are compared with the Nash equilibria of the world economy when each country uses its domestic tax system to...

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...

This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a...

This paper analyzes asymmetric tax competition under formula apportionment. It sets up a model with multinationals where two welfare-maximizing jurisdictions of different size levy source-based corporate taxes and allocate taxes using the formula approach. At the Nash equilibrium, tax rates are...