) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …

punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding. -- deterrence ; public good experiment ; inequity …) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect …

backfires as special agents extract significantly more resources. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism sustains contributions … stigmatization effect for the special agent as he receives substantially more peer punishment while contributions by other agents do … not change. Finally full transparency of all agents actions creates full accountability as it allows targeted punishment …

-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

subjects to punish free-riders increases cooperation in the public goods game, and that the degree of punishment is sensitive … cadets' reluctance or willingness to punish non-cooperators in a public goods experiment. We employ a standard public goods … game with punishment, but in addition to knowing how much each player contributed to the group good, subjects also know the …

We report experimental findings on the impact of network structure on decentralized monitoring and punishment in public … exogenously determined network. We examine contributions and punishment decisions in three network environments - a Complete … hypothesis that asymmetry in the network leads to discriminatory punishment across potential targets on the basis of their …

This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment …, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate … introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this “enlarged …