cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences …

existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes … all possible matches. Finally, we analyze a notion of the core and its relation with the set of stable assignments. …

stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the …We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with … between core and competitive equilibria is established …

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of … the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if …