In illiquid markets, option traders may have an incentive to increase their portfolio value by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. We provide a mathematical framework within which to value derivatives under market impact in a multi-player framework by introducing strategic...

In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person...

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination...

We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

I study the effect of public information disclosure in a market setting where private information acquisition exhibits strategic complementarity. To overcome the issue of equilibrium multiplicity, I introduce heterogeneous information cost and imperfect information on the cost distribution. The...

We identify analysts' information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR server activity to analysts' brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 26% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts' attention to public information is driven by the...

We study an endowment economy with heterogeneous agents and two complementary consumption goods, one of which is indivisible. Although agents have standard concave preferences, the indivisibility gives rise to Friedman-Savage convexity in indirect utility. Agents care about relative, not just...

This is the supplemental material to the paper titled "Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition." It includes additional empirical, theoretical, and quantitative results. It also includes illustration for the numerical algorithm for our model solution

We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...